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+# Feature Specification: Security & Safety
+# Feature ID: F-SEC (F-SEC-001 to F-SEC-004)
+
+**Document Type:** Feature Specification  
+**Version:** 1.0  
+**Date:** 2025-01-19  
+**Feature Category:** Security & Safety  
+
+## 1. Feature Overview
+
+### 1.1 Feature Purpose
+
+The Security & Safety feature provides comprehensive security enforcement and safety mechanisms for the ASF Sensor Hub. This feature ensures that only trusted firmware executes, sensitive data is protected at rest and in transit, and all communications maintain confidentiality and integrity through cryptographic mechanisms.
+
+### 1.2 Feature Scope
+
+**In Scope:**
+- Hardware-enforced secure boot with cryptographic verification
+- Flash encryption for sensitive data protection at rest
+- Mutual TLS (mTLS) for secure communication channels
+- Security violation detection and response mechanisms
+- Device identity management and authentication
+
+**Out of Scope:**
+- Cloud server security policies and infrastructure
+- User identity management and access control systems
+- Physical tamper detection hardware (future enhancement)
+- Cryptographic key generation and signing infrastructure
+
+## 2. Sub-Features
+
+### 2.1 F-SEC-001: Secure Boot
+
+**Description:** Hardware-enforced secure boot implementation using Secure Boot V2 to ensure only authenticated and authorized firmware images execute on the Sensor Hub.
+
+**Secure Boot Configuration:**
+```c
+typedef struct {
+    secure_boot_version_t version;    // Secure Boot V2
+    signature_algorithm_t algorithm;  // RSA-3072 or ECDSA-P256
+    uint8_t root_key_hash[32];       // Root-of-trust key hash (eFuse)
+    bool anti_rollback_enabled;      // eFuse-based anti-rollback
+    uint32_t security_version;       // Current security version
+    boot_verification_mode_t mode;   // Hardware-enforced verification
+} secure_boot_config_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SECURE_BOOT_V2 = 2               // Only supported version
+} secure_boot_version_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    SIG_ALG_RSA_3072 = 0,           // RSA-3072 signature
+    SIG_ALG_ECDSA_P256 = 1          // ECDSA-P256 signature
+} signature_algorithm_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    BOOT_MODE_DEVELOPMENT = 0,       // Development mode (key revocable)
+    BOOT_MODE_PRODUCTION = 1         // Production mode (key permanent)
+} boot_verification_mode_t;
+```
+
+**Boot Verification Flow:**
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+    participant PWR as Power On
+    participant ROM as ROM Bootloader
+    participant SB as Secure Boot V2
+    participant EFUSE as eFuse Storage
+    participant APP as Application
+    participant DIAG as Diagnostics
+    
+    PWR->>ROM: System Reset/Power On
+    ROM->>SB: Load Firmware Image
+    SB->>EFUSE: readRootKeyHash()
+    EFUSE-->>SB: root_key_hash
+    
+    SB->>SB: verifyFirmwareSignature(root_key_hash)
+    
+    alt Signature Valid
+        SB->>SB: checkAntiRollback()
+        alt Version Valid
+            SB->>APP: jumpToApplication()
+            APP->>DIAG: logBootEvent(SECURE_BOOT_SUCCESS)
+        else Version Invalid
+            SB->>SB: enterBootFailureState()
+            SB->>DIAG: logBootEvent(ANTI_ROLLBACK_VIOLATION)
+        end
+    else Signature Invalid
+        SB->>SB: enterBootFailureState()
+        SB->>DIAG: logBootEvent(SECURE_BOOT_FAILURE)
+    end
+```
+
+**Root-of-Trust Management:**
+- **Key Storage:** Root public key hash stored in eFuse (one-time programmable)
+- **Key Revocation:** Not supported in production mode (permanent key)
+- **Anti-Rollback:** eFuse-based security version enforcement
+- **Verification:** Every boot cycle (cold and warm boots)
+
+**Boot Failure Handling:**
+- **BOOT_FAILURE State:** System enters safe state, no application execution
+- **Diagnostic Logging:** Boot failure events logged to NVS (if accessible)
+- **Recovery:** Manual intervention required (re-flashing with valid firmware)
+
+### 2.2 F-SEC-002: Secure Flash Storage
+
+**Description:** Comprehensive flash encryption implementation using AES-256 to protect sensitive data stored in internal flash and external storage devices.
+
+**Flash Encryption Configuration:**
+```c
+typedef struct {
+    encryption_algorithm_t algorithm; // AES-256
+    encryption_mode_t mode;          // Release mode (recommended)
+    uint8_t encryption_key[32];      // Hardware-derived key (eFuse)
+    bool transparent_decryption;     // Automatic decryption on read
+    flash_encryption_scope_t scope;  // Encrypted regions
+} flash_encryption_config_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    ENCRYPT_AES_256 = 0             // AES-256 encryption
+} encryption_algorithm_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    ENCRYPT_MODE_DEVELOPMENT = 0,    // Development mode (key readable)
+    ENCRYPT_MODE_RELEASE = 1         // Release mode (key protected)
+} encryption_mode_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    bool firmware_encrypted;         // Application partitions
+    bool nvs_encrypted;             // NVS partition
+    bool machine_constants_encrypted; // MC data
+    bool calibration_encrypted;     // Calibration data
+    bool diagnostics_encrypted;     // Diagnostic logs
+} flash_encryption_scope_t;
+```
+
+**Encrypted Data Categories:**
+| Data Type | Storage Location | Encryption Method | Access Control |
+|-----------|------------------|-------------------|----------------|
+| **Firmware Images** | Flash partitions | Hardware AES-256 | Transparent |
+| **Machine Constants** | NVS partition | Hardware AES-256 | Component-mediated |
+| **Calibration Data** | NVS partition | Hardware AES-256 | Component-mediated |
+| **Cryptographic Keys** | eFuse/Secure NVS | Hardware AES-256 | Restricted access |
+| **Diagnostic Logs** | NVS partition | Hardware AES-256 | Component-mediated |
+| **SD Card Data** | External storage | Software AES-256 | Optional encryption |
+
+**External Storage Encryption:**
+```c
+typedef struct {
+    bool sd_encryption_enabled;      // SD card encryption flag
+    uint8_t sd_encryption_key[32];   // SD-specific encryption key
+    encryption_algorithm_t algorithm; // AES-256 for SD card
+    file_encryption_policy_t policy; // Per-file encryption policy
+} external_storage_encryption_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    FILE_ENCRYPT_NONE = 0,          // No encryption
+    FILE_ENCRYPT_SENSITIVE = 1,     // Encrypt sensitive files only
+    FILE_ENCRYPT_ALL = 2            // Encrypt all files
+} file_encryption_policy_t;
+```
+
+**Encryption Flow:**
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+    participant APP as Application
+    participant PERSIST as Persistence
+    participant ENCRYPT as Encryption Engine
+    participant NVS as NVS Storage
+    participant SD as SD Card
+    
+    Note over APP,SD: Secure Data Storage Flow
+    
+    APP->>PERSIST: storeSensitiveData(data, type)
+    PERSIST->>PERSIST: classifyDataSensitivity(type)
+    
+    alt Critical Data (NVS)
+        PERSIST->>ENCRYPT: encryptData(data, NVS_KEY)
+        ENCRYPT-->>PERSIST: encrypted_data
+        PERSIST->>NVS: writeEncrypted(encrypted_data)
+        NVS-->>PERSIST: writeComplete()
+    else Regular Data (SD Card)
+        alt SD Encryption Enabled
+            PERSIST->>ENCRYPT: encryptData(data, SD_KEY)
+            ENCRYPT-->>PERSIST: encrypted_data
+            PERSIST->>SD: writeEncrypted(encrypted_data)
+        else SD Encryption Disabled
+            PERSIST->>SD: writePlaintext(data)
+        end
+    end
+    
+    PERSIST-->>APP: storageComplete()
+```
+
+### 2.3 F-SEC-003: Encrypted Communication
+
+**Description:** Mutual TLS (mTLS) implementation for secure communication with Main Hub and peer devices, ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of all transmitted data.
+
+**Device Identity and Authentication:**
+```c
+typedef struct {
+    uint8_t device_certificate[2048]; // X.509 device certificate (max 2KB)
+    uint8_t private_key[256];        // Device private key (RSA-2048/ECDSA-P256)
+    uint8_t ca_certificate[2048];    // Certificate Authority certificate
+    char device_id[64];              // Unique device identifier
+    uint64_t certificate_expiry;     // Certificate expiration timestamp
+    bool certificate_valid;          // Certificate validation status
+} device_identity_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    tls_version_t version;           // TLS 1.2 minimum
+    cipher_suite_t cipher_suite;     // Supported cipher suites
+    bool mutual_auth_required;       // mTLS enforcement
+    uint32_t session_timeout;        // TLS session timeout
+    bool session_resumption;         // Session resumption support
+} tls_config_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+    TLS_VERSION_1_2 = 0x0303,       // TLS 1.2 (minimum required)
+    TLS_VERSION_1_3 = 0x0304        // TLS 1.3 (preferred)
+} tls_version_t;
+```
+
+**Supported Cipher Suites:**
+| Cipher Suite | Key Exchange | Encryption | MAC | Recommended |
+|-------------|-------------|------------|-----|-------------|
+| **TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384** | ECDHE-RSA | AES-256-GCM | SHA384 | Yes |
+| **TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384** | ECDHE-ECDSA | AES-256-GCM | SHA384 | Yes |
+| **TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384** | RSA | AES-256-GCM | SHA384 | Fallback |
+
+**mTLS Handshake Flow:**
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+    participant SH as Sensor Hub
+    participant MH as Main Hub
+    participant CA as Certificate Authority
+    
+    Note over SH,CA: Mutual TLS Handshake
+    
+    SH->>MH: ClientHello + SupportedCipherSuites
+    MH->>SH: ServerHello + SelectedCipherSuite
+    MH->>SH: ServerCertificate
+    MH->>SH: CertificateRequest
+    MH->>SH: ServerHelloDone
+    
+    SH->>SH: validateServerCertificate()
+    SH->>CA: verifyCertificateChain(server_cert)
+    CA-->>SH: validationResult(VALID)
+    
+    SH->>MH: ClientCertificate
+    SH->>MH: ClientKeyExchange
+    SH->>MH: CertificateVerify
+    SH->>MH: ChangeCipherSpec
+    SH->>MH: Finished
+    
+    MH->>MH: validateClientCertificate()
+    MH->>CA: verifyCertificateChain(client_cert)
+    CA-->>MH: validationResult(VALID)
+    
+    MH->>SH: ChangeCipherSpec
+    MH->>SH: Finished
+    
+    Note over SH,MH: Secure Channel Established
+    
+    SH<->>MH: EncryptedApplicationData
+```
+
+**Certificate Management:**
+- **Device Certificate:** Unique X.509 certificate per device (max 2KB)
+- **Private Key:** RSA-2048 or ECDSA-P256 stored securely in eFuse/NVS
+- **Certificate Chain:** Root CA and intermediate certificates
+- **Certificate Rotation:** Managed on broker/server side
+- **Revocation:** Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) or broker-side denylists
+
+**Key Lifecycle Management:**
+| Phase | Mechanism | Responsibility |
+|-------|-----------|----------------|
+| **Manufacturing** | Device certificate and private key injection | Manufacturing process |
+| **Provisioning** | Certificate validation and registration | Onboarding system |
+| **Operation** | TLS session key generation and management | Runtime TLS stack |
+| **Rotation** | Certificate renewal and update | Server-side management |
+| **Revocation** | Certificate invalidation and replacement | Certificate Authority |
+
+### 2.4 F-SEC-004: Security Violation Handling
+
+**Description:** Comprehensive security violation detection, classification, and response system to handle security threats and maintain system integrity.
+
+**Security Violation Types:**
+```c
+typedef enum {
+    SEC_VIOLATION_BOOT_FAILURE = 0x1001,      // Secure boot verification failure
+    SEC_VIOLATION_AUTH_FAILURE = 0x1002,      // Authentication failure
+    SEC_VIOLATION_CERT_INVALID = 0x1003,      // Certificate validation failure
+    SEC_VIOLATION_MESSAGE_TAMPER = 0x1004,    // Message integrity violation
+    SEC_VIOLATION_UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS = 0x1005, // Unauthorized access attempt
+    SEC_VIOLATION_ROLLBACK_ATTEMPT = 0x1006,  // Anti-rollback violation
+    SEC_VIOLATION_KEY_COMPROMISE = 0x1007,    // Cryptographic key compromise
+    SEC_VIOLATION_REPLAY_ATTACK = 0x1008      // Message replay attack
+} security_violation_type_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    security_violation_type_t type;   // Violation type
+    diagnostic_severity_t severity;   // FATAL, ERROR, WARNING
+    uint64_t timestamp;              // Violation timestamp
+    char source_component[32];       // Component that detected violation
+    char description[128];           // Human-readable description
+    uint8_t context_data[64];        // Violation-specific context
+    uint32_t occurrence_count;       // Number of occurrences
+    bool escalation_triggered;       // Escalation flag
+} security_violation_event_t;
+```
+
+**Violation Response Matrix:**
+| Violation Type | Severity | Immediate Response | Escalation Action |
+|---------------|----------|-------------------|-------------------|
+| **Boot Failure** | FATAL | Enter BOOT_FAILURE state | System halt, manual recovery |
+| **Auth Failure** | ERROR | Reject connection, log event | Escalate to FATAL after 3 failures |
+| **Cert Invalid** | ERROR | Reject connection, log event | Escalate to FATAL if persistent |
+| **Message Tamper** | WARNING | Discard message, log event | Escalate to ERROR if repeated |
+| **Unauthorized Access** | FATAL | Deny access, log event | System lockdown |
+| **Rollback Attempt** | FATAL | Prevent rollback, log event | System halt |
+| **Key Compromise** | FATAL | Revoke keys, log event | System lockdown |
+| **Replay Attack** | WARNING | Discard message, log event | Escalate to ERROR if persistent |
+
+**Security Event Flow:**
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+    participant COMP as Security Component
+    participant SEC as Security Manager
+    participant DIAG as Diagnostics
+    participant STM as State Manager
+    participant LOG as Security Logger
+    
+    Note over COMP,LOG: Security Violation Detection and Response
+    
+    COMP->>SEC: reportSecurityViolation(type, context)
+    SEC->>SEC: classifyViolation(type)
+    SEC->>SEC: determineResponse(type, severity)
+    
+    alt Severity == FATAL
+        SEC->>STM: triggerStateTransition(FAULT)
+        SEC->>LOG: logSecurityEvent(FATAL, details)
+        SEC->>DIAG: reportDiagnosticEvent(FATAL, violation)
+    else Severity == ERROR
+        SEC->>SEC: checkEscalationCriteria()
+        alt Escalation Required
+            SEC->>STM: triggerStateTransition(WARNING)
+        end
+        SEC->>LOG: logSecurityEvent(ERROR, details)
+        SEC->>DIAG: reportDiagnosticEvent(ERROR, violation)
+    else Severity == WARNING
+        SEC->>LOG: logSecurityEvent(WARNING, details)
+        SEC->>DIAG: reportDiagnosticEvent(WARNING, violation)
+    end
+    
+    SEC->>SEC: updateViolationStatistics()
+    SEC->>SEC: checkPatterns()
+```
+
+**Escalation Criteria:**
+- **Authentication Failures:** 3 consecutive failures within 5 minutes
+- **Message Tampering:** 5 tampered messages within 1 minute
+- **Certificate Violations:** Persistent certificate validation failures
+- **Pattern Detection:** Coordinated attack patterns across multiple violation types
+
+## 3. Requirements Coverage
+
+### 3.1 System Requirements (SR-XXX)
+
+| Feature | System Requirements | Description |
+|---------|-------------------|-------------|
+| **F-SEC-001** | SR-SEC-001, SR-SEC-002, SR-SEC-003, SR-SEC-004 | Secure boot verification and root-of-trust protection |
+| **F-SEC-002** | SR-SEC-005, SR-SEC-006, SR-SEC-007, SR-SEC-008 | Flash encryption and secure storage |
+| **F-SEC-003** | SR-SEC-009, SR-SEC-010, SR-SEC-011, SR-SEC-012 | Encrypted communication and mTLS |
+| **F-SEC-004** | SR-SEC-013, SR-SEC-014, SR-SEC-015 | Security violation handling and response |
+
+### 3.2 Software Requirements (SWR-XXX)
+
+| Feature | Software Requirements | Implementation Details |
+|---------|---------------------|----------------------|
+| **F-SEC-001** | SWR-SEC-001, SWR-SEC-002, SWR-SEC-003 | Boot verification, signature validation, anti-rollback |
+| **F-SEC-002** | SWR-SEC-004, SWR-SEC-005, SWR-SEC-006 | AES-256 encryption, key management, storage protection |
+| **F-SEC-003** | SWR-SEC-007, SWR-SEC-008, SWR-SEC-009 | mTLS implementation, certificate management, session security |
+| **F-SEC-004** | SWR-SEC-010, SWR-SEC-011, SWR-SEC-012 | Violation detection, response coordination, escalation logic |
+
+## 4. Component Implementation Mapping
+
+### 4.1 Primary Components
+
+| Component | Responsibility | Location |
+|-----------|---------------|----------|
+| **Security Manager** | Security policy enforcement, violation handling | `application_layer/security/` |
+| **Secure Boot** | Boot-time firmware verification | `bootloader/secure_boot/` |
+| **Encryption Engine** | Cryptographic operations, key management | `application_layer/security/crypto/` |
+| **Certificate Manager** | Certificate validation, lifecycle management | `application_layer/security/cert_mgr/` |
+
+### 4.2 Supporting Components
+
+| Component | Support Role | Interface |
+|-----------|-------------|-----------|
+| **Network Stack** | TLS/DTLS transport layer | `drivers/network_stack/` |
+| **NVM Driver** | Secure storage access | `drivers/nvm/` |
+| **Diagnostics** | Security event logging | `application_layer/diag_task/` |
+| **State Manager** | Security-triggered state transitions | `application_layer/business_stack/STM/` |
+
+### 4.3 Component Interaction Diagram
+
+```mermaid
+graph TB
+    subgraph "Security & Safety Feature"
+        SEC[Security Manager]
+        BOOT[Secure Boot]
+        CRYPTO[Encryption Engine]
+        CERT[Certificate Manager]
+    end
+    
+    subgraph "System Components"
+        STM[State Manager]
+        DIAG[Diagnostics]
+        NET[Network Stack]
+        NVM[NVM Driver]
+    end
+    
+    subgraph "Hardware Security"
+        EFUSE[eFuse Storage]
+        HWCRYPTO[Hardware Crypto]
+        FLASH[Flash Memory]
+    end
+    
+    subgraph "External Interfaces"
+        MH[Main Hub]
+        CA[Certificate Authority]
+    end
+    
+    BOOT --> EFUSE
+    BOOT --> HWCRYPTO
+    BOOT --> SEC
+    
+    SEC <--> STM
+    SEC <--> DIAG
+    SEC --> CRYPTO
+    SEC --> CERT
+    
+    CRYPTO --> HWCRYPTO
+    CRYPTO --> NVM
+    
+    CERT --> NET
+    CERT --> CA
+    
+    NET <-->|mTLS| MH
+    
+    SEC -.->|Security Events| DIAG
+    STM -.->|State Changes| SEC
+```
+
+### 4.4 Security Enforcement Flow
+
+```mermaid
+sequenceDiagram
+    participant BOOT as Secure Boot
+    participant SEC as Security Manager
+    participant CRYPTO as Encryption Engine
+    participant CERT as Certificate Manager
+    participant NET as Network Stack
+    participant MH as Main Hub
+    
+    Note over BOOT,MH: Security Enforcement Flow
+    
+    BOOT->>BOOT: verifyFirmwareSignature()
+    BOOT->>SEC: secureBootComplete(SUCCESS)
+    SEC->>SEC: initializeSecurityPolicies()
+    
+    SEC->>CRYPTO: initializeEncryption()
+    CRYPTO->>CRYPTO: loadEncryptionKeys()
+    
+    SEC->>CERT: initializeCertificates()
+    CERT->>CERT: validateDeviceCertificate()
+    
+    NET->>CERT: establishTLSConnection(main_hub)
+    CERT->>CERT: performMutualAuthentication()
+    CERT-->>NET: tlsConnectionEstablished()
+    
+    NET<->>MH: secureDataExchange()
+    
+    alt Security Violation Detected
+        SEC->>SEC: handleSecurityViolation(type)
+        SEC->>DIAG: logSecurityEvent(violation)
+        SEC->>STM: triggerSecurityResponse(action)
+    end
+```
+
+## 5. Feature Behavior
+
+### 5.1 Normal Operation Flow
+
+1. **Boot-Time Security:**
+   - Secure Boot V2 verifies firmware signature using root-of-trust
+   - Anti-rollback mechanism prevents firmware downgrade attacks
+   - Flash encryption automatically decrypts application code
+   - Security Manager initializes and loads security policies
+
+2. **Runtime Security:**
+   - All communication channels use mTLS with mutual authentication
+   - Sensitive data encrypted before storage using AES-256
+   - Certificate validation performed for all external connections
+   - Security violations monitored and logged continuously
+
+3. **Communication Security:**
+   - Device certificate presented during TLS handshake
+   - Server certificate validated against trusted CA chain
+   - Encrypted data exchange using negotiated cipher suite
+   - Session keys rotated according to security policy
+
+4. **Violation Response:**
+   - Security violations detected and classified by severity
+   - Immediate response actions taken based on violation type
+   - Escalation logic applied for repeated or coordinated attacks
+   - Security events logged for audit and analysis
+
+### 5.2 Error Handling
+
+| Error Condition | Detection Method | Response Action |
+|----------------|------------------|-----------------|
+| **Boot Verification Failure** | Signature validation failure | Enter BOOT_FAILURE state, halt system |
+| **Certificate Validation Failure** | X.509 validation error | Reject connection, log security event |
+| **Encryption Key Failure** | Key derivation/access error | Enter FAULT state, disable encryption |
+| **TLS Handshake Failure** | Protocol negotiation failure | Retry with fallback, log failure |
+| **Message Integrity Failure** | MAC/signature verification failure | Discard message, log tampering event |
+| **Anti-Rollback Violation** | Version check failure | Prevent boot, log violation |
+
+### 5.3 State-Dependent Behavior
+
+| System State | Feature Behavior |
+|-------------|------------------|
+| **INIT** | Initialize security components, load certificates and keys |
+| **RUNNING** | Full security enforcement, continuous violation monitoring |
+| **WARNING** | Enhanced security monitoring, stricter validation |
+| **FAULT** | Critical security functions only, preserve security logs |
+| **OTA_UPDATE** | Secure OTA validation, maintain security during update |
+| **TEARDOWN** | Secure data flush, maintain encryption during shutdown |
+| **SERVICE** | Limited security access for diagnostics |
+| **BOOT_FAILURE** | Security violation state, no application execution |
+
+## 6. Feature Constraints
+
+### 6.1 Timing Constraints
+
+- **Boot Verification:** Maximum 5 seconds for secure boot completion
+- **TLS Handshake:** Maximum 10 seconds for mTLS establishment
+- **Certificate Validation:** Maximum 2 seconds per certificate
+- **Violation Response:** Maximum 100ms for immediate response actions
+
+### 6.2 Resource Constraints
+
+- **Certificate Storage:** Maximum 2KB per certificate (device, CA)
+- **Key Storage:** Secure storage in eFuse or encrypted NVS
+- **Memory Usage:** Maximum 64KB for security buffers and state
+- **CPU Usage:** Maximum 10% for cryptographic operations
+
+### 6.3 Security Constraints
+
+- **Root-of-Trust:** eFuse-based, one-time programmable
+- **Key Protection:** Hardware-protected keys, no plaintext exposure
+- **Certificate Validation:** Full chain validation required
+- **Encryption Strength:** AES-256 minimum for all encryption
+
+## 7. Interface Specifications
+
+### 7.1 Security Manager Public API
+
+```c
+// Security initialization and control
+bool secMgr_initialize(void);
+bool secMgr_isSecurityEnabled(void);
+security_status_t secMgr_getSecurityStatus(void);
+
+// Violation handling
+bool secMgr_reportViolation(security_violation_type_t type, 
+                           const char* source, const uint8_t* context);
+bool secMgr_getViolationHistory(security_violation_event_t* events, size_t* count);
+bool secMgr_clearViolationHistory(void);
+
+// Security policy management
+bool secMgr_setSecurityPolicy(const security_policy_t* policy);
+bool secMgr_getSecurityPolicy(security_policy_t* policy);
+bool secMgr_enforceSecurityPolicy(void);
+```
+
+### 7.2 Encryption Engine API
+
+```c
+// Encryption operations
+bool crypto_encrypt(const uint8_t* plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
+                   const uint8_t* key, uint8_t* ciphertext, size_t* ciphertext_len);
+bool crypto_decrypt(const uint8_t* ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
+                   const uint8_t* key, uint8_t* plaintext, size_t* plaintext_len);
+
+// Hash operations
+bool crypto_sha256(const uint8_t* data, size_t data_len, uint8_t* hash);
+bool crypto_hmac_sha256(const uint8_t* data, size_t data_len,
+                       const uint8_t* key, size_t key_len, uint8_t* hmac);
+
+// Key management
+bool crypto_generateKey(key_type_t type, uint8_t* key, size_t key_len);
+bool crypto_deriveKey(const uint8_t* master_key, const char* context,
+                     uint8_t* derived_key, size_t key_len);
+```
+
+### 7.3 Certificate Manager API
+
+```c
+// Certificate operations
+bool certMgr_loadDeviceCertificate(const uint8_t* cert_data, size_t cert_len);
+bool certMgr_validateCertificate(const uint8_t* cert_data, size_t cert_len);
+bool certMgr_getCertificateInfo(certificate_info_t* info);
+
+// TLS integration
+bool certMgr_setupTLSContext(tls_context_t* ctx);
+bool certMgr_validatePeerCertificate(const uint8_t* peer_cert, size_t cert_len);
+bool certMgr_getTLSCredentials(tls_credentials_t* credentials);
+```
+
+## 8. Testing and Validation
+
+### 8.1 Unit Testing
+
+- **Secure Boot:** Firmware signature validation with valid/invalid signatures
+- **Encryption:** AES-256 encryption/decryption with known test vectors
+- **Certificate Validation:** X.509 certificate parsing and validation
+- **Violation Handling:** All violation types and response actions
+
+### 8.2 Integration Testing
+
+- **End-to-End Security:** Complete security flow from boot to communication
+- **mTLS Integration:** Full TLS handshake with certificate validation
+- **State Integration:** Security behavior across all system states
+- **Cross-Component Security:** Security enforcement across all components
+
+### 8.3 System Testing
+
+- **Security Penetration Testing:** Simulated attacks and vulnerability assessment
+- **Performance Testing:** Cryptographic operations under load
+- **Fault Injection:** Security behavior under hardware/software faults
+- **Long-Duration Testing:** Security stability over extended operation
+
+### 8.4 Acceptance Criteria
+
+- Secure boot prevents execution of unsigned firmware
+- All sensitive data encrypted at rest and in transit
+- mTLS successfully established with valid certificates
+- Security violations properly detected and responded to
+- No security vulnerabilities identified in penetration testing
+- Performance impact of security features within acceptable limits
+- Complete audit trail of all security events
+
+## 9. Dependencies
+
+### 9.1 Internal Dependencies
+
+- **State Manager:** Security-triggered state transitions
+- **Diagnostics:** Security event logging and audit trail
+- **Network Stack:** TLS/DTLS transport implementation
+- **NVM Driver:** Secure storage for keys and certificates
+
+### 9.2 External Dependencies
+
+- **ESP-IDF Security Features:** Secure Boot V2, Flash Encryption, eFuse
+- **Hardware Security Module:** Hardware-accelerated cryptography
+- **Certificate Authority:** Certificate validation and management
+- **Cryptographic Libraries:** mbedTLS or equivalent for TLS implementation
+
+## 10. Future Enhancements
+
+### 10.1 Planned Improvements
+
+- **Hardware Security Module:** Dedicated HSM for key management
+- **Physical Tamper Detection:** Hardware-based tamper detection
+- **Advanced Threat Detection:** Machine learning-based anomaly detection
+- **Quantum-Resistant Cryptography:** Post-quantum cryptographic algorithms
+
+### 10.2 Scalability Considerations
+
+- **Fleet Security Management:** Centralized security policy management
+- **Certificate Automation:** Automated certificate lifecycle management
+- **Security Analytics:** Advanced security event correlation and analysis
+- **Zero-Trust Architecture:** Comprehensive zero-trust security model
+
+---
+
+**Document Status:** Final for Implementation Phase  
+**Component Dependencies:** Verified against architecture  
+**Requirements Traceability:** Complete (SR-SEC, SWR-SEC)  
+**Next Review:** After component implementation