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ASF_01_sys_sw_arch/System Design/Creating Gap Analysis and Solutions Documentation/pasted_content.txt
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Great, thanks for sharing the gap analysis — this is actually a **very solid foundation** already. Whats missing now is not “features”, but **industrial-grade decisions, architectures, and concrete implementation patterns** that close those gaps in a *reliable, production-ready* way on **ESP32-S3 + ESP-IDF v5.4**.
Below is a **structured proposal** that:
* Closes the **critical & high gaps**
* Uses **industrial best practices**
* Stays **realistic for ESP32-S3**
* Avoids “maker-grade” shortcuts
Ill group this by **system layer**, not by gap ID — thats how real systems are engineered.
---
# 1⃣ Communication Architecture (Industrial-Grade Proposal)
## 1.1 Primary & Secondary Communication Stack
### ✅ Final Decision
| Role | Technology | Why (Industrial Rationale) |
| ---------------------------------- | --------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- |
| **Primary uplink** | **Wi-Fi 802.11n (2.4 GHz)** | Existing infra, high throughput for OTA |
| **Peer-to-peer** | **ESP-NOW** | Deterministic, low latency, no AP dependency |
| **Long-range fallback (optional)** | **LoRa (external module)** | Farm-scale resilience |
> ⚠️ Zigbee on ESP32-S3 is **not industrial-mature** in ESP-IDF. ESP-NOW is far more reliable.
---
## 1.2 Application Protocol (This Is a Big Gap)
### ❌ Avoid
* Raw TCP sockets
* Custom binary protocols without versioning
### ✅ Use
**MQTT over TLS 1.2**
| Item | Decision |
| ----------- | ------------------------------- |
| Broker | Main Hub / Edge Gateway |
| QoS | QoS 1 (at least once) |
| Retain | Config topics only |
| Payload | CBOR (binary, versioned) |
| Topic model | `/farm/{site}/{house}/{node}/…` |
📌 **Why MQTT?**
* Store-and-forward
* Built-in keepalive
* Industrial tooling & monitoring
* ESP-IDF native support (stable)
---
## 1.3 Heartbeat & Liveness (Formalized)
```text
Heartbeat interval: 10 s
Missed heartbeats: 3 → offline
Payload:
{
uptime,
fw_version,
free_heap,
rssi,
error_bitmap
}
```
This directly feeds **predictive maintenance**.
---
# 2⃣ Security Model (Non-Negotiable for Industrial Systems)
## 2.1 Root of Trust (ESP32-S3 Strength)
### Mandatory Features
✅ Secure Boot V2
✅ Flash Encryption
✅ eFuse-based version anti-rollback
> **No exceptions.** This is where “industrial” starts.
---
## 2.2 Device Identity & Authentication
### Proposed Model (Used in Industry)
| Item | Implementation |
| ------------ | ------------------------------------- |
| Identity | **Device-unique X.509 certificate** |
| Private key | Stored in **eFuse / encrypted flash** |
| Auth | **Mutual TLS (mTLS)** |
| Provisioning | Factory or secure onboarding mode |
📌 **Key insight**
ESP32-S3 can handle **1 device cert perfectly**. Do **NOT** try to manage large cert chains on-device.
---
## 2.3 Key Lifecycle (Often Ignored — You Shouldnt)
| Phase | Mechanism |
| ------------- | ------------------------- |
| Manufacturing | Inject device cert + key |
| Operation | TLS session keys only |
| Rotation | Broker-side cert rotation |
| Revocation | CRL or broker denylist |
---
# 3⃣ OTA Strategy (Industrial Safe Updates)
## 3.1 Partition Layout (Recommended)
For **8MB flash**:
```text
bootloader
partition_table
factory (optional minimal rescue)
ota_0 (3.5 MB)
ota_1 (3.5 MB)
nvs (64 KB, encrypted)
phy_init
coredump (64 KB)
```
---
## 3.2 OTA Policy (Formal)
| Step | Rule |
| ------------ | --------------------------- |
| Download | HTTPS / MQTT chunks |
| Chunk size | 4096 bytes |
| Integrity | SHA-256 full image |
| Validation | Boot + health report |
| Confirmation | App must confirm within 60s |
| Failure | Automatic rollback |
This closes **GAP-OTA-001/002/003** cleanly.
---
# 4⃣ Sensor & Data Acquisition (Reliability Focus)
## 4.1 Sensor Abstraction Layer (SAL)
This is **critical** for long-term maintainability.
```c
sensor_read()
sensor_calibrate()
sensor_validate()
sensor_health_check()
```
Each sensor driver **must implement** this interface.
---
## 4.2 Approved Industrial Sensor Strategy
### Example (CO₂)
| Primary | Backup |
| ---------------- | ------------------ |
| Sensirion SCD41 | Senseair S8 |
| I²C | UART |
| Self-calibration | Manual calibration |
📌 **Rule:**
Every *critical parameter* → **two qualified sensor options**
---
## 4.3 Warm-Up & Validity States
Define sensor states explicitly:
```text
INIT → WARMUP → STABLE → DEGRADED → FAILED
```
Never publish raw values without a **validity flag**.
---
## 4.4 Filtering (Simple & Robust)
**Recommended Default**
* Median filter (N=5)
* Rate-of-change limiter
* Physical bounds check
This avoids Kalman overengineering.
---
# 5⃣ Data Persistence & Reliability
## 5.1 SD Card (Industrial Pattern)
| Aspect | Decision |
| ------------- | -------------------------- |
| FS | FAT32 |
| Mode | SDMMC 4-bit |
| Structure | Circular time-bucket files |
| Write pattern | Append-only |
| Flush | On power-loss interrupt |
📌 **Never write small files frequently** → SD wear.
---
## 5.2 NVS Usage Rules
| Data | Location |
| ----------- | --------------------- |
| Calibration | NVS (encrypted) |
| Constants | NVS |
| Counters | RAM + periodic commit |
| Logs | SD / flash partition |
---
# 6⃣ Diagnostics & Maintainability
## 6.1 Diagnostic Code System
**Proposed Format**
```
0xSCCC
S = Severity (14)
CCC = Subsystem code
```
| Range | Subsystem |
| ------ | --------- |
| 0x1xxx | DAQ |
| 0x2xxx | COM |
| 0x3xxx | SEC |
| 0x4xxx | OTA |
| 0x5xxx | HW |
This allows **fleet analytics**, not just debugging.
---
## 6.2 Watchdogs (Layered)
| Watchdog | Purpose |
| ------------- | ------------------- |
| Task WDT | Deadlocks |
| Interrupt WDT | ISR hangs |
| RTC WDT | Total system freeze |
**10s / 3s / 30s** is a good baseline.
---
# 7⃣ Power & Fault Handling (Farm Reality)
## 7.1 Brownout & Power Loss
| Feature | Implementation |
| --------------- | -------------------- |
| Brownout detect | 3.0 V |
| ISR action | Flag + flush buffers |
| Recovery | Clean reboot |
Optional but recommended:
* Supercap for 12 seconds
* External RTC battery
---
# 8⃣ GPIO & Hardware Discipline
## Mandatory Rules
❌ No strapping pins
❌ No shared I²C without pull-up audit
❌ No ADC2 for Wi-Fi systems
Create **one canonical GPIO map document** — no exceptions.
---
# 9⃣ What You Have vs What You Need
### You already have:
✅ Good functional coverage
✅ Clear system intent
✅ ESP32-S3 (excellent choice)
### What this proposal adds:
✅ Determinism
✅ Security maturity
✅ Fleet-scale maintainability
✅ Industrial fault tolerance
---
## 🚜 Bottom Line
Your system is **no longer a prototype** — its becoming an **industrial embedded product**.
If you want, next we can:
* Turn this into a **formal system architecture diagram**
* Define a **FreeRTOS task model**
* Design a **factory provisioning workflow**
* Or map this directly to **ESP-IDF components & Kconfig options**
Just tell me where you want to go next.